Research
My dissertation asks when and how mid-level bureaucrats become drivers of institutional change in advance capitalist democracies.
I develop a theory of Bureaucratic Ideational Statecraft, identifying ideational construction, procedural leveraging and epistemic coalition-building as key mechanisms through which officials translate ideas into new forms of market governance. Officials convert economic ideas into viable reform pathways, then persuade decisionmakers by leveraging agenda-setting authority, control over technical design, and expert networks. Variation in economic ideas and procedural strategies helps explain whether bureaucratic ideational statecraft succeeds under broadly similar enabling conditions. I test these arguments by tracing major reform episodes in German fiscal policy, U.S. industrial policy, and Irish and New Zealand labor-market policy.
The project draws on extensive cross-national fieldwork, including interviews with former heads of state and records collected from four government archives. I have developed the project through visiting affiliations at the German Economic Institute, University College Dublin, and the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, working with communities spanning political science, economics, and policy practice.